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Dec 4
by order of 30
NO 031

FORTY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP
Office of the Historical Officer

Dec 45 *ell*
WFL/aim

45C Hanger 031
14 February 1945

REMARKS HISTORY

December thru 31 December 1944

General:

December marked the calendar termination of the year 1944, the year which at its beginning had been publicly endorsed both officially and unofficially as the "Year of Victory". The validity of such speculations had been proven, yet the year brought the Allies into a clear and unobstructed view of ultimate victory.

While American, British, Canadian, French and Russian armies pushed and shoved the Germans back into the corner of Germany itself, the war against Japan had been moved over from a series of pending maneuvers to a strong offensive program. The Japs were withdrawing from Burma and the Indo-China road as a first step to be opened. Guided and protected by the tremendous American Naval power of the 3rd and 7th Fleets, General Douglas MacArthur had moved with amazing audacity, by a series of leap frog amphibious movements, into the heart of the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. Saipan, Guam, Rika and other islands in the Marianas had been wrested from the enemy and now served as the jumping off point for B-29 attacks on Japan and B-24 operations on the Solomons Islands and sinking Jap shipping. The overall picture of Allied movements to final victory in the Pacific was watched with amazement by civilians back home as well as by the men in the India-China and China Theaters, who knew full well the tremendous problem of supply that had to be licked continuously to make possible such moves.

Men in the Squadron, while vitally concerned in the overall Pacific picture, were primarily interested in B-29 operations of the XI Bomber Command. Looking back over the past eight months of combat activity they could justifiably be proud of their accomplishments in the face of countless obstacles. Their work and sweat as a part of the Command's efforts had produced a "know-how" for the B-29 crews that were being trained to hit with regularity at the heart of Japanese industrial strength. No one but the men who flew the early missions of those first few months could tell the story of the courage and determination that was needed to make possible the heart-warming news to the Allied world, "B-29 Superfortresses of the XI Bomber Command today bombed industrial installations on the island of KYUSHU on the Japanese Mainland". Targets in CHINA, INDIA, JAPAN,

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History, 45th Bomb G., 1 Dec thru 31 Dec 44, 14 Feb 45, Cont'd.

Manila, Burma, Thailand, Malaya and India were struck during the year, many of which had never felt the weight of Allied bombs. In addition the cameras of 29 photo-recon planes had caught hundreds of the installations in its eyes and furnished countless pieces of information to the Planning Division of the Joint Command.

None of the accomplishments had been made without a price. Good friend and good men had paid with the greatest price possible - - - their lives. As Christmas Day rolled around it was occasion to solemnly note and pray that their sacrifice had not been in vain - - - that the prayer of "Peace on earth, good will to men" would be answered in the new year of 1945.

Operations

Concept:

The first mission for the month of December appropriately fell on 7 December, third anniversary of the Jap sneak attack on Pearl Harbor, HAWAII. The blow was against the aircraft factory at MURDEN, MANCHURI. Aircraft from the Squadron started moving to the forward area on 2 December and by 3 December eight (8) planes were at A-1 available for the mission.

On the afternoon of 3 December briefing was held and the target was announced as the aircraft factory at OYAMA, JAPAN. The weather conditions at this time were in question. After the briefing was concluded all the crews ate supper and went to bed for a few hours sleep before take-off time. Just before time to get up word came through the barracks that the mission had been called off. On the following two consecutive nights the weather forecast at the last minute indicated that OYAMA would be overcast and unsuitable for precision bombing. On each occasion the mission was postponed, but before the crews were scheduled to awake.

Finally on 6 December the location of the primary target was changed to the aircraft factory, at MURDEN, MANCHURI. With the weather prognosis favorable the briefing and take-off went off without a hitch. Twenty-nine (29) aircraft were parked in the near-freezing weather on the "doughnuts" at A-1 and available for the mission. Starting at 061930Z a total of 27 aircraft were airborne, the last one taking off at 062025Z. Two aircraft were ground aborts due to mechanical difficulties encountered on the run-up.

All eight (8) aircraft of the 45th Bomb Squadron were airborne and were a part of the 23 aircraft of the 40th Bomb Group to reach the primary target and which landed in two formations. The first formation, consisting of 12 aircraft from the 40th Bomb Group and one each from the 46th and 462nd bouted A-1 at 062000Z and at 0197Z with good observed results which were confirmed by strike photos. The center of the bomb pattern was essential to

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SECRET. 20th Bomb Group. 2 Dec 44. 14 Feb 45. Cont'd.

the point of the aiming point, but considerable damage was believed inflicted. The strike photos also revealed the beginning of a smoke screen by the enemy which quickly and effectively blanketed the target area including the arsenal and barracks. The remaining 11 aircraft arrived over the target approximately 20 minutes later at which time the target was completely covered by the above mentioned smoke screen. It was believed that most bombs from this formation fell in the 20 yards considerably south of the target area due to some aircraft releasing prematurely by accident. The other aircraft in the formation had very considerable amounts of ice and frost on the windows and probably started this way following the accidental release.

Enemy aircraft position over the primary target was moderate. The first formation found enemy fighters waiting for them over the target. When it was apparent that the formation was proceeding to SUKDEB the enemy immediately retreated and were in position over SUKPSN for the later formations. Most attacks were not closely pressed home, being broken off at around 500 yards. 4th Bomb Group aircraft claimed a total of three destroyed, one probably destroyed and six damaged enemy aircraft.

Anti-aircraft fire was heavier and inaccurate at the primary target. Weather over the primary target was G4VB.

One aircraft due to mechanical difficulties bombed the secondary target with poor observed results. Weather was about 3/10 cloud covered and no enemy fighters or anti-aircraft fire were encountered.

One aircraft due to mechanical difficulty was forced to jettison.

Aircraft #303 of the 4th Bomb Squadron was hit by enemy fighters over the primary target and was being escorted back to base by aircraft #729 and #275. Enroute the three plane formation was subject to another fighter attack during which #303 was further damaged. At 0552 at position 20°30'N-113°00'W the crew of #303 were forced to abandon the aircraft when the prop on #1 eng flew off. Eleven chutes were seen to open and the aircraft exploded against the side of a mountain shortly thereafter.

Several facts stood out in connection with the mission. First a great variety of enemy fighters were encountered. Practically all types, even including obsolete CLAUDE and VALS with fixed landing gear were reported along with the latest and most modern types of fighters. Secondly, severe icing and frosting of the windows in the nose section presented a serious problem for accurate bombing. Depressurizing and opening the cockpit windows did not seem to help. Lt "Shorty" HORTON flying in #579 kept a small hole about 2" x 6" scraped clean in order to be able to see the bombs from the lead plane from not only to solve the problem that affects bombing. It is also a hazard even enemy fighter attacks come from the frontal quarter, when clear vision

From: Boris Angelov
Time: 2002-12-16 03:43:39
Text: Hello,

I created a new 4cindexer.pl and started it from the SSH. I suppose it works OK, but i'd like you to test it. The script uses 4conf.pl. The only thing I modified were the script paths.
The script took from 5 to 10 % CPU resource.

To test DBoard I need something which gives an error like an Web page or shell script.

brgds
HC-Support

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Aircraft #42-24406 BURDEN

13:10 hours

Capt ROBBY, J. A. (F)
 1st Lt BRADEN, J. F. (CF)
 1st Lt DEVA, S. C. (N)
 1st Lt DAVIS, I. C. (S)
 2nd Lt JAMESON, J. L. (E)

Sgt Smith, J. T. (F)
 S Sgt Druce, J. L. (CF)
 S Sgt Kesteloot, R. T. (CF)
 S Sgt Edlridge, J. L. (CF)
 Sgt Stewart, J. (V)
 T Sgt Halgren, J. (TG)
 Sgt Nelson, J. (F)

Aircraft #42-24470 BURDEN

14:15 hours

1st Lt BRADEN, J. F. (F)
 1st Lt BRADEN, J. F. (CF)
 2nd Lt LINDER, J. C. (F)
 2nd Lt FORTNEY, J. (S)
 F/O [unclear], J. (E)

Sgt Hutchinson, J. (CF)
 Sgt Garner, J. E. (CF)
 Sgt Bass, J. G. (S)
 T Sgt Blackard, J. C. (TG)
 Cpl Johnson, J. C. (F)

Aircraft #42-24407 BURDEN

15:35 hours

Maj [unclear], R. (F)
 1st Lt COMBLY, J. (CF)
 1st Lt FOWLER, J. A. (E)
 1st Lt LUSTIG, J. (N)
 1st Lt BRIDGES, J. F. (V)
 1st Lt BRIDGES, J. F. (S)

Sgt Newaker, R. (S)
 S Sgt Greenfield, J. E. (CF)
 S Sgt Sprague, J. (S)
 S Sgt Tucker, J. (S)
 T Sgt Berts, J. F. (TG)

Aircraft #42-24579 BURDEN

16:10 hours

Maj [unclear], I. V. (P)
 Capt HILLS, J. E. (CF)
 Capt LE GRANGE, H. H. (N)
 1st Lt NORTON, J. H. (S)
 1st Lt WEINBERG, E. F. (V)
 F/O GRACE, L. L. (FE)
 Capt LONAN, C. P. (K)

T Sgt Thompson, F. H. (F)
 S Sgt Skole, J. A. (CF)
 S Sgt Mc Bride, L. (S)
 S Sgt Winborn, J. P. (CF)
 S Sgt Glover, D. C. (S)

Aircraft #42-6913 BURDEN

17:15 hours

Capt GILSON, J. (P)
 1st Lt SANFORD, L. F. (CF)
 Capt BARKER, H. E. (N)
 1st Lt GIFF, J. H. (S)
 1st Lt WOODLEY, L. A. (FE)

Sgt Anthony, J. J. (S)
 S Sgt de Layo, J. F. (CF)
 S Sgt Sloan, J. S. (S)
 S Sgt Johnson, J. F. (S)
 S Sgt Martin, J. A. (TG)
 S Sgt Allen, J. E. (S)

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History, 45th Bomb Sq, 1 Dec thru 31 Dec 44, 14 Feb 45, Cont'd.

Seven days after the MAKIEN mission the second mission to be conducted in December was directed against the Rama VI BR bridge at BANGKOK, THAILAND. Briefing was held in the early evening hours of 13 December in the Group War Room. Little did anyone realize how disastrous the results of the mission would be as the primary target was announced. The attack would certainly not be a "milk run", but for crews who had seen the opposition the enemy offered over JAPAN and MANCHURIA the mission was more or less routine after the heavy take-off in darkness had been accomplished.

The mission began when the first aircraft was airborne at 132117Z. Twelve aircraft of which four were 45th Bomb Squadron planes took off, the last at 132132Z.

Of the 12 aircraft airborne 11 proceeded as briefed to the primary target, but found that cloud cover obscured the target. No anti-aircraft fire or fighters were encountered. Two bombing runs were made in an attempt to carry out visual bombing, but it was not possible to see the bridge, so the formation proceeded to the assigned IF (KAIKONGMAUNG ISLAND) for the secondary target, the Central RR Station and Yards at BANGKOK, THAILAND. An excellent bombing run was made in CAVU weather at 20,000' which "bombs away" at 0100Z.

Just a few seconds after bombs were released the formation was suddenly thrown into confusion and out of control by a violent explosion in the air. The cause of the explosion was not definitely identified, but all indications pointed to the fact that two or more of the 500 lb GP bombs had detonated a few seconds after they were released. Some crew members stated that intense predicted concentrations of flak was seen at the same moment. Theory was also advanced that an anti-aircraft projectile might have made a direct hit on a bomb.

Regardless of the cause the experience was a strange and a costly one. One aircraft was seen to flip over on its back and dived towards the ground in flames. Another aircraft had a wing on fire and was seen out of control. One aircraft is missing altogether and one is presumed to have been abandoned approximately 100 miles west of BANGKOK. All aircraft that returned to base bore marks of damage.

The co-pilot of aircraft #500 stated that he observed #501 flip over on its back belching flames and out of control. Lt Col IRA CORNETT, formation commander from the 45th Bomb Squadron in #729 reported that he was in radio contact with #574 directly after the accident. Capt ROBERT SHANKS of #574 wanted to bail out right away, but Col CORNETT told him to wait until the last minute in an effort to get back to the coast. About 25 minutes after leaving the target area Col CORNETT was once again in contact with #574 at which time Capt SHANKS stated he was going to have to bail out and gave his position as approximately 100 miles west of BANGKOK. There was no further contact.

All the 11 aircraft over the secondary target of BANGKOK were to return directly to base. The aircraft were returning and were to be ready to battle damage, and aircraft landed at 0117Z.

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REPORT, 2nd Bomb Sq, 1st Div, 21 Dec 44, 14 Feb 45, Cont'd.

and was further damaged when it ran off the end of the runway. Four aircraft, as stated before are missing. Aircraft #831 and #574 were lost from the 15th Bomb Squadron. Of the two other Squadron planes on the mission, aircraft #407 landed at CHITTAGONG and #859 due to loss of one engine bombed the last resort target at BASSIN. Strike photos revealed excellent bombing results. No antiaircraft fire or fighters were encountered.

Members of the Squadron were stunned by the losses sustained over BANGKOK and little, if any, solace was obtained from the post-mission photos, although it was revealed that excellent bombing had been done. A very compact pattern measuring only 1600' across was centered squarely on the yard. Damage resulting was heavy and included the virtual destruction of the air station, four passenger loading platforms, five receiving sheds, and several small miscellaneous shops. Out of a total of 15 lines through the yard 11 were cut by one or more hits and the remaining were at least temporarily blocked by wreckage. Thirty-five railroad stock were either destroyed or damaged and 60 more probably damaged.

Photo cover of BANGKOK revealed that formations of the other three groups in the AA Bomber Command missed the bridge. To the 10th Bomb Group went credit for the only successful bombing of the day.

Members from the 15th Bomb Squadron that flew on the mission are listed below:

Aircraft #42-24407		BANGKOK		10:40 hours		
1st Lt	ROSS, R E	(P)		S Sgt	Hentmaker, F M	(R)
1st Lt	CONLEY, R W	(CP)		S Sgt	Osdney, L F	(CFC)
1st Lt	LESTIG, D M	(N)		S Sgt	Tucker, R S	(LG)
1st Lt	POLLARD, R L	(B)		S Sgt	Searage, J R	(SG)
1st Lt	BRUSCO, J P	(V)		T Sgt	Berts, A F	(TG)
P/O	HEWELT, J D	(E)				

Aircraft #42-24574		BANGKOK		Entire crew missing		
Capt	STANKS, R C	(P)		S Sgt	Majors, F T	(R)
1st Lt	FLETCHER, H E	(CP)		S Sgt	Summers, L W	(V)
2nd Lt	COCHRAN, J G	(N)		S Sgt	Collesby, H P	(CFC)
2nd Lt	BERNARDI, G R	(B)		S Sgt	Lantz, W R	(SG)
2nd Lt	BERNARDI, G M	(E)		S Sgt	Boche, A H J	(LG)
				T Sgt	Pasterzi, S E	(TG)

Aircraft #42-9331		BANGKOK		Entire crew missing		
1st Lt	WELLEN, W E	(P)		Sgt	Brooks, R M	(R)
1st Lt	PAUL, G E	(CP)		Sgt	Darson, R E	(V)
2nd Lt	LARSEN, H	(N)		Sgt	Hering, V L	(CFC)
2nd Lt	MC GIVERN, J B	(B)		Sgt	Wutcheon, L I	(SG)
2nd Lt	PARMELEE, H S	(E)		Sgt	Walden, K A	(LG)
				Sgt	Walden, A A	(TG)

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Summary Report Group 12 Area 31 Dec 44, 12:00 hours, General

Aircraft # 42-43059 MISSION (LAT) 1200 hours

Capt <u>FAWON</u> , <u>J L</u>	(1)	S Sgt <u>Davis</u> , <u>J L</u>	(1)
1st Lt <u>WIX</u> , <u>A</u>	(CP)	Sgt <u>Wright</u> , <u>J A</u>	(1)
1st Lt <u>Wright</u> , <u>J</u>	(1)	S Sgt <u>Flower</u> , <u>S G</u>	(3)
1st Lt <u>Wright</u> , <u>J L</u>	(1)	S Sgt <u>Johnson</u> , <u>L L</u>	(1)
S/O <u>Wright</u> , <u>J</u>	(1)	S Sgt <u>Ransom</u> , <u>R D</u>	(2)
Sgt <u>Wright</u> , <u>J A</u>	(1)	S Sgt <u>Sutton</u> , <u>J L</u>	(1)

On the following day (15 Dec) Capt Wright and crew took off early in the morning and conducted a search mission for aircraft #379. The probable position of the bail out was covered thoroughly, but no trace of plane wreckage or crew members could be found. However, it remained that somehow, somewhere the crew was safe on the ground and making their way to the coast where to leave British naval patrols might see them and effect rescue.

Also on 15 December a field order came in directing the movement of aircraft to the forward area. On 17 December the Group dispatched 17 B-29 aircraft to A-1, five of which were 45th Bomb Squadron planes. The next few days were busy ones for crew members who were in OPIA.

Starting at 1700Z a total of 10 aircraft were airborne to attack the target area at the river port of Wagon, G.I.A. One aircraft was a ground abort because of mechanical difficulty. All five of the Squadron aircraft were airborne and successfully bombed the target.

Capt Wright and crew in #379 led a formation of 13 aircraft while two other aircraft followed the large formation over the target one minute later. One aircraft had been unable to retract its landing gear and returned to A-1 with full bomb load.

The 12 Group aircraft bombing Wagon released a total of 102 A-47 and 37 A-76 type bombs. Both type bombs were fused instantaneous nose and non-delay tail. Weather over the target was CAVG, but a 75 knot headwind was encountered at the bombing altitude of 17,000'. The wind, plus the fact that the trail value of the A-47 bomb was so excessive for the bomb sight that Capt Richard Serlach had to aim 1700' over the intended aiming point in order to compensate for the deficiency, resulted in a very wide dispersion of the bombs.

Due to the extreme trail, cameras in the aircraft could not be tilted back far enough to obtain adequate strike photo coverage. However with initial burst fire meager and fighter opposition weak, an excellent bomb run was made. As the aircraft left the target numerous fires and great quantities of smoke were seen which showed the bombs had gone into the target. All aircraft returned safely to A-1 with the last plane down at 10041Z.

The Wagon mission was short, much to the crews liking. Of most value was the fact that the target was important to the Japs - - - that it was

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Aircraft 42-579

- | | | | |
|------------|------|-----------|-----|
| 1st Lt ... | (P) | P Sgt ... | (A) |
| 1st Lt ... | (CP) | P Sgt ... | (B) |
| 1st Lt ... | (S) | P Sgt ... | (C) |
| 1st Lt ... | (B) | S Sgt ... | (D) |
| 1st Lt ... | (V) | S Sgt ... | (E) |
| 1st Lt ... | (R) | | |

Aircraft 42-579

- | | | | |
|------------|------|-----------|-----|
| 1st Lt ... | (A) | S Sgt ... | (A) |
| 1st Lt ... | (CP) | S Sgt ... | (B) |
| 1st Lt ... | (S) | S Sgt ... | (C) |
| 1st Lt ... | (B) | S Sgt ... | (D) |
| 1st Lt ... | (V) | S Sgt ... | (E) |
| 1st Lt ... | (R) | S Sgt ... | (F) |

Aircraft 42-2866

- | | | | |
|------------|------|-----------|-----|
| 1st Lt ... | (P) | S Sgt ... | (A) |
| 1st Lt ... | (CP) | S Sgt ... | (B) |
| 1st Lt ... | (S) | S Sgt ... | (C) |
| 1st Lt ... | (B) | S Sgt ... | (D) |
| 1st Lt ... | (V) | S Sgt ... | (E) |
| 1st Lt ... | (R) | S Sgt ... | (F) |

Aircraft 42-24738

- | | | | |
|------------|------|-----------|-----|
| 1st Lt ... | (P) | P Sgt ... | (A) |
| 1st Lt ... | (CP) | S Sgt ... | (B) |
| 1st Lt ... | (S) | S Sgt ... | (C) |
| 1st Lt ... | (B) | S Sgt ... | (D) |
| 1st Lt ... | (V) | P Sgt ... | (E) |
| 1st Lt ... | (R) | | |

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1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100.

- | | | | |
|------------------------|------|-----------------------|------|
| 1st Lt. [Name], [Rank] | (1) | 1 Sgt. [Name], [Rank] | (1) |
| 1st Lt. [Name], [Rank] | (2) | 1 Sgt. [Name], [Rank] | (2) |
| 1st Lt. [Name], [Rank] | (3) | 1 Sgt. [Name], [Rank] | (3) |
| 1st Lt. [Name], [Rank] | (4) | 1 Sgt. [Name], [Rank] | (4) |
| 1st Lt. [Name], [Rank] | (5) | 1 Sgt. [Name], [Rank] | (5) |
| 1st Lt. [Name], [Rank] | (6) | 1 Sgt. [Name], [Rank] | (6) |
| 1st Lt. [Name], [Rank] | (7) | 1 Sgt. [Name], [Rank] | (7) |
| 1st Lt. [Name], [Rank] | (8) | 1 Sgt. [Name], [Rank] | (8) |
| 1st Lt. [Name], [Rank] | (9) | 1 Sgt. [Name], [Rank] | (9) |
| 1st Lt. [Name], [Rank] | (10) | 1 Sgt. [Name], [Rank] | (10) |

It was a little after noon when the planes turned to A-1 from [Location]. After interrogations and lunch, flight plans were provided for [Location] and [Location]. It was announced that supper would be held at a [Location] and that [Location] and another briefing [Location] directly thereafter.

At the briefing the target was announced as the old favorite, the [Location] factory at [Location], JAPAN. Weather prognosis was that [Location] would be partially cloud covered, with the hope that visual bombing could be accomplished.

Take off began at 12:30Z. A total of 12 aircraft from the Group were airborne with the last aircraft taking off at 1:20:12Z. Six (6) of the 12 aircraft were Squadron planes - - - - - and some five that were on the [Location] mission plus #739 which had arrived at A-1 that afternoon.

A total of [Location] aircraft of which five were from the Squadron, succeeded in reaching the primary target in formation. Major [Name] and crew in #579 were once again in the lead as the formation released a total of 41 #500 M-61 and 45 #500 M-76 type bombs on [Location] at 01:30Z from 22000 feet. The M-61 bombs were fused .1 sec nose and .025 sec tail delay and the M-76 bombs were fused instantaneous nose and non-delay tail. The weather was 10/10 undercast necessitating the use of radar to make the bomb run and release. Antiaircraft fire was meager and inaccurate and only weak fighter opposition was encountered.

One aircraft was unable to join the 40th bomb group formation and finally joined a seven plane formation of the 402nd Group. After leaving the 1P formation commander of that Group decided against bombing the primary target due to the undercast and the formation proceeded to [Location], the secondary target, and bombed visually from 20000 feet with good observed results. Antiaircraft fire was meager and inaccurate and fighter opposition was weak.

One aircraft, unable to join any formation, proceeded to bomb [Location] from 22000 feet with good observed results encountering no opposition.

Another aircraft due to mechanical difficulties bombed the target of last resort from 20000 feet with good results encountering no opposition.

Aircraft #106 with Captain [Name] and crew on board had to be abandoned in the vicinity of [Location] shortly after take off. Fire broke out in either the top cylinders or the accessories section of #1 engine. The fire was a flashing type preceded by backfiring with the engine running.

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1000, 1942, 1943, 1944, 1945, 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950, 1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955, 1956, 1957, 1958, 1959, 1960, 1961, 1962, 1963, 1964, 1965, 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025

very rough. Captain ROSSBY reduced to 1000 rpm on #1 engine for about seconds and then the backfiring stopped and increased power was in. One again the backfiring started and the engine continued to run rough. tried to increase rpm but was unable to do so. A large amount of motor oil was seen coming from the engine, so the #1 and #2 were jettisoned in seconds as normal use of fuel and when the #1 engine was impacted. Air #2 was reduced to 1700 rpm and increased power was added on the #2 engine. #1 lines (#1-3) and course taken for #1 in order to make an emergency landing. Captain ROSSBY stated he was just able to maintain altitude as #1 could not be started as engine was losing oil rapidly. #1 engine started to #1 run out of fuel and all on the instruments on #1 went out. In about five minutes #1 prop started to run away and created a terrific whirl which drew attention of conversation over the intercom as described with vibration of #2 left wing. Captain ROSSBY then gave the order to bail out of the aircraft. Position at time of bail out was approximately 30 miles northeast of ...

All crew members bailed in close proximity of one another. There were only minor injuries. They all made the ... they spent the night. The next day (20 ...) they were picked up at ... and taken back to #1.

Exception of aircraft #4-24466 ... on the mission ...

Below are the names of the 1st Squadron that flew on the mission:

Aircraft #4-24466 (Bailed out near ... 2:30 hours

| | | | |
|------------------|------|----------------|-------|
| Capt ROSSBY, G A | (P) | Sgt Smith, J T | (...) |
| 1st Lt ... | (GP) | Sgt ... | (...) |
| 1st Lt ... | (N) | Sgt ... | (...) |
| 1st Lt ... | (B) | Sgt ... | (...) |
| 2nd Lt ... | (SE) | Sgt ... | (...) |
| | | Sgt ... | (...) |

Aircraft #42-21739 OMBRA 11:00 hours

| | | | |
|------------|------|---------|-------|
| Capt ... | (P) | Sgt ... | (...) |
| 1st Lt ... | (GP) | Sgt ... | (...) |
| 1st Lt ... | (N) | Sgt ... | (...) |
| 1st Lt ... | (B) | Sgt ... | (...) |
| 1st Lt ... | (NS) | Sgt ... | (...) |
| 2nd Lt ... | (V) | Sgt ... | (...) |

Aircraft #42-24577 OMBRA 11:40 hours

| | | | |
|------------|------|---------|-------|
| Capt ... | (P) | Sgt ... | (...) |
| 1st Lt ... | (GP) | Sgt ... | (...) |
| Capt ... | (N) | Sgt ... | (...) |
| Capt ... | (B) | Sgt ... | (...) |

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History, 1st Cont. Sq, 1 Dec thru 31 Dec 45, 1 Feb 46, Cont'd

Aircraft #4-22779 (Cont'd) OADR 12:40 hours
 1st Lt BRIDGES, L F (P) Capt Richard, J H (R)
 P.O. SMITH, A L (PS)

Aircraft #4-22108 OADR 13:25 hours
 Capt SMITH, J S (P) Capt Stockton, J I (R)
 1st Lt HAY, W F (CP) Capt Barrett, W H (PS)
 1st Lt BRIDGES, L F (H) Capt Trace, W A (R)
 2nd Lt BRIDGES, J M (S) Capt Love, P J (LS)
 1st Lt SMITH, J S (PS) Capt Vogel, H B (KS)
 Capt Sienkiewicz, S V (V)

Aircraft #4-22730 OADR 14:05 hours
 Maj ROSS, A T (P) Capt Klover, R V (R)
 1st Lt ELLIOTT, J H (CP) Capt Kinney, L F (PS)
 1st Lt ROSS, D M (H) Capt Austin, C H (LS)
 1st Lt ELLIOTT, C S (H) Capt Lucia, J (KS)
 1st Lt ELLIOTT, R C (V) Capt Cox, J G (PS)
 P.O. SMITH, J D (PS)

Aircraft #4-23059 OADR 14:50 hours
 Capt WILSON, C M (P) Capt Davis, S M (R)
 1st Lt WIX, R A (CP) Capt Wagner, S A (V)
 1st Lt POWERS, W M (P) Capt Farrar, S G (PS)
 1st Lt SMITH, W L (H) Capt Johnston, L L (LS)
 P.O. PIRAS, J (PS) Capt Rawson, M D (KS)
 Capt Satterfield, J L (R)

That night a "three balls" alert was called for A-1 by Fighter Command Colonel RICHARD, Group Commander, gave orders for several planes to be ferried bombs up that day to take off and return to India immediately. Aircraft #276, manned by Captain RALPH BALL and crew, was a Squadron plane among those that took off. Due to the rush the take off was accomplished without first having transferred the gas in the bomb bay tanks to the wing tanks, since it was believed that this could be done in flight.

However, as soon as the aircraft had settled on course and an attempt made to transfer fuel, the system was found to be inoperative. All valves were checked and fuses were changed but the system still wouldn't work. Captain BALL then ordered the bomb bay salvaged and the aircraft lightened by jettisoning all excess equipment, and decided to make an emergency landing at YUMANYI, since he had ample gas in the wing tanks to reach that point. He instructed the radio operator to contact that station at YUMANYI. After several repeated attempts, the radio operator was unable to get through and when he arrived over the area of YUMANYI there was a radio broadcast.

SECRET

1. The following information was received from the 1st Air Force, 12/15/44.

2. The following information was received from the 1st Air Force, 12/15/44.

3. The following information was received from the 1st Air Force, 12/15/44.

4. The following information was received from the 1st Air Force, 12/15/44.

5. The following information was received from the 1st Air Force, 12/15/44.

6. The following information was received from the 1st Air Force, 12/15/44.

7. The following information was received from the 1st Air Force, 12/15/44.

8. The following information was received from the 1st Air Force, 12/15/44.

9. The following information was received from the 1st Air Force, 12/15/44.

10. The following information was received from the 1st Air Force, 12/15/44.

11. The following information was received from the 1st Air Force, 12/15/44.

SECRET

1. 2000 hours 1000 hours 1000 hours 1000 hours 1000 hours 1000 hours

When the smoke screen lay on the ground fires in the target area after turning on the landing gun.

Lighter opposition was very serious, the forms had been under almost constant attack from fighters after leaving the IP until leaving the target area. Practically every type of enemy fighter was encountered ranging from obsolete biplane to the newer biplane and attacks were vigorously pressed home. Several instances of fuel burning were reported. Whether it was intentional or not could not be determined.

Intense opposition was encountered during, ranging from accurate to inaccurate.

One aircraft was damaged by opportunity fire from the transfer of the engine inoperative. Another aircraft was damaged by opportunity fire from the necessary to transfer to engine.

Seven enemy aircraft destroyed and seven downed were claimed by the group.

One of the J-3 tanks and crew flying in aircraft 2-2111 and in formation with the 25th Bomb Group sustained battle damage to the aircraft when a 3.5 inch cannon shell hit in the fuselage compartment. The pilot blew immediately and no one in the plane was injured.

All aircraft returned safely to Base with the last plane landing at 10:00.

Attached below are the names of personnel that were on the missions:

| | | |
|--------------------------|------------|-------------------------|
| Aircraft 2-2579 | 1000 hours | |
| 1st Lt GARDNER, J. H. | (P) | 1 Sgt [redacted], J. C. |
| 1st Lt SANDERS, R. F. | (CP) | 1 Sgt [redacted], J. L. |
| Capt SANDERS, J. F. | (A) | 1 Sgt [redacted], J. J. |
| Capt SCHMIDT, R. J. | (d) | 1 Sgt [redacted], J. J. |
| 1st Lt [redacted], L. J. | (V) | 1 Sgt [redacted], J. J. |
| 1st Lt [redacted], R. L. | (E) | |

| | | |
|--|------------|--|
| Aircraft 2-21738 | 1000 hours | |
| Down by 25th Squadron by Capt [redacted], W. [redacted] crew | | |

| | | |
|--------------------------|------------|-------------------------|
| Aircraft 2-21101 | 1000 hours | |
| Capt [redacted], J. J. | (P) | 1 Sgt [redacted], J. I. |
| 1st Lt [redacted], J. J. | (CP) | 1 Sgt [redacted], J. H. |
| 1st Lt [redacted], J. A. | (N) | 1 Sgt [redacted], J. B. |
| 1st Lt [redacted], G. H. | (E) | 1 Sgt [redacted], J. J. |
| 2nd Lt [redacted], J. H. | (B) | 1 Sgt [redacted], J. J. |
| | | 1 Sgt [redacted], J. J. |

SECRET

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- | | | | |
|---------|-----|---------|-----|
| [Faded] | (1) | [Faded] | (1) |
| [Faded] | (2) | [Faded] | (2) |
| [Faded] | (3) | [Faded] | (3) |
| [Faded] | (4) | [Faded] | (4) |

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- | | | | |
|---------|-----|---------|-----|
| [Faded] | (1) | [Faded] | (1) |
| [Faded] | (2) | [Faded] | (2) |
| [Faded] | (3) | [Faded] | (3) |
| [Faded] | (4) | [Faded] | (4) |

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1944, 1 Dec 31, 1944

... presents a more interesting Christmas story, is the... of Christmas Eve. In... notes of old Christmas... in the clear... struck a... chord in the hearts... of those present, some of whom were spending their first Christmas... loved ones.

... the... of the... Squadron... enjoyed tree beer and sandwiches in the Officer's Club. ... Group Commander visited with... and other... and also dropped in on the... party. ... Colonel... was with... in the organization... while Colonel... was... his satisfaction... of...

... served a heavy... of turkey, cranberry sauce, vegetable salad, mince... all the usual... that... received. In the afternoon athletic... officers... the... the... the distance he... out on the long... score.

... The... of heavy ack-... closely... on

... numerous slit trenches... attack seemed incred-... The... of six or seven... split up... to Shakulia... on the base. As... Christmas came to an end at Shakulia.

The next day activity in the Squadron was... routine. Main-... In two weeks four... repairs were needed.

CONCLUSION

December was a... month... temperatures. Only... exception of heavy... dust was thick on... and it was of...

SECRET

Reference: Weather Report, 1 Dec 1944, Alaska, 1944, 1944, 1944, 1944, 1944, 1944

Reference: Figures from the Base Weather records for the month follow:

| | |
|------------------------------------|--------------|
| Normal Rainfall for Month | 0.00 inches |
| Actual Rainfall for Month | 0.00 inches |
| Normal cooling was below 1000 feet | None |
| Highest maximum temperature | 60° (23 Dec) |
| Highest minimum temperature | 51° (27 Dec) |
| Average maximum temperature | 53° |
| Average minimum temperature | 47° |
| Average temperature | 70° |

Engineering:

The month of December witnessed little change in engineering technique. The flight engineers and personnel continued to turn out good maintenance in preparing the Superforts for combat situations. Capt Harold V. Jensen took over the duties of Chief and Capt Orville E. (Sgt) Simons returned to his first love, the color and was assigned to aircraft 4990 the day after Christmas.

All planes in use or organization except #29, 12 and #110 underwent engine cowling flap modification during the month. The modification not only made a drag by lessening surface, but also kept engine cooler even when in almost closed position.

Five new B-29 aircraft were received and assigned to the organization during December. All of them were installed with completely modified engines which included cross over oil tubes, ducted fuel lines and reworked rocker arms. The following new aircraft were assigned in December and recorded as gains:

| <u>Date</u> | <u>Aircraft Number</u> | <u>Origin of Manufacturer</u> |
|-------------|------------------------|-------------------------------|
| 3 Dec | 42-24739 | Wichita |
| 6 Dec | 42-93359 | Renton, Seattle |
| 16 Dec | 42-24718 | Wichita |
| 22 Dec | 42-24740 | Wichita |
| 29 Dec | 42-24795 | Wichita |

The following aircraft were erased from the Squadron's records during the month:

| <u>Date</u> | <u>Aircraft Number</u> | <u>Reason</u> |
|-------------|------------------------|---|
| 14 Dec | 42-6303 | Returned to USA by AIC |
| 15 Dec | 42-24574 | Lost on standard mission of 14 December |
| 15 Dec | 42-93831 | Lost on standard mission of 14 December |
| 17 Dec | 42-24566 | Abandoned by crew over Alaska |
| 19 Dec | 42-5278 | Abandoned by crew over Alaska |

SECRET

... ..

...

... .. required by Major to be carried on with normal increased in tempo section was set up which program of training were for the also of ground school let it and training and the section.

... .. was scarcely over the range work of Loren navigator plane during

... .. pilots, co-pilots, radio to performance and maintenance aircraft.

... .. was performed in approx days.

... .. Up!

... .. to look as

... .. received the first B-29 aircraft to come off the production line at Boeing's Wichita factory in July 1943. Lt Col was checked off almost immediately and to become first pilot Air Transport Squadron.

... .. with pilots organization in heavy given further specialized training in order to effectively handle the new

... .. of B-29's force of the possible to of the



SECRET

History, 15th Bomb Sq, 1 Dec thru 31 Dec 44, Pages 45, Cont'd

Personnel and equipment were in place at Dehra Dun, India by the end of April. Flight operations began in May with cargo hauls across the Hump to the forward area field in China. Engines, spare parts, personnel, gasoline and a thousand different items were carried to China to set up the base and to provide the material and personnel necessary to sustain combat operations started from that point.

The Hump became a proving ground for the B-29. Heavy aircraft loading and high temperatures of India on take off, weather and hazardous terrain tested the pilot's skill on every flight, yet each flight was like a trip with an "unknown." Flares and instruments were lost over the Hump. However, no one could look back "and say the losses were due to pilot error, because at the time the accidents occurred the reason was that something happened with his navigation that the pilot knew nothing about. Those flights, though promoting a "know how" for the B-29. Emergencies and near accidents provided information on equipment failures and the characteristics of the B-29 that necessitated modifications.

Combat missions began with the first mission to BANGKOK on 1 June followed by the IANAN, JAPAN strike on 1 June. Two missions in July and one in August provided several items of information. Cruise control, range, bomb load, formation, egress, radar and radio operation were just a few.

September brought the assignment of General CURTIS E. LEMAY to the XXI Bomber Command as Commanding General. During the months that followed his determination and development of tactics paid heavy dividends. Initiation of the 11 plane formation, the "noisy point and lead crew" principle were outstanding developments. Increased range, bomb load and strike efficiency. Emphasis on identification and better pilot perfection improved combat results. The combat crew members boost when they realized their efforts were going to tell on the enemy.

The Squadron played an important part in all phases of operations. Each week and each month saw it develop more into a strong combat organization. It faced the new year of 1945 with confidence and ability gained through the most trying period of its organization and growth since the war began. Looking at this year, there were no certain doubts could be formed.

The B-29, generally speaking, is beyond doubt an outstanding success in the design for which it was designed. Its performance in speed, maneuverability, range, power, capacity and its ability to carry a heavy load are the expectancy of the designers and the production. Modifications have been made in the operation of auxiliary equipment and many more alterations are being made.

It is the duty of the command to ensure that the B-29 is maintained in the best possible condition and that the crew members are properly trained and equipped for their duties. The command will continue to work for the improvement of the B-29 and the well-being of its crew members.

SECRET

discussing the... 1 sec para of... 14 Feb 45, cont'd

undoubtedly over all the runways, especially at approach speeds for landing. It is possible to use one or more on one side when on landing approach and it is still necessary to get the airplane up to the runway, because the power is relatively ineffective it is sometimes impossible to maintain speed at approach and the airplane is pulled to one side by the power of the remaining engines. A somewhat longer runway might be used without becoming difficult to control, because at present it is difficult to pull runway... 200 ft without too much effort.

The development of an effective heating system, which keeps ice from forming on the wings inside the airplane when temperatures are very low, has been one of the greatest problems encountered in operation. Experiments have shown, however, that a solution is being had by periodic problems and... of... solution.

The importance of the engine has become progressively less difficult. The most factor was the modifications on the engines of the new airplanes required in the organization. For engine operation and better lubrication required. With the unmodified engine it was found necessary to inspect the valves of the cylinders (Nos 1, 3, 5, 7) every 25 hours of operation and all cylinders every 50 hours. The check for side play in the valve guide was found to be an important factor in the Squadron's success in not losing an engine in the air, because of valve failure, since the latter part of July 1944. The check is also called on modified engine, so far no one... valve side play and... found.

The increase in authorization of airplane mechanics work, which greatly facilitates the maintenance. This fact is especially true, since we can handle five or more airplanes on hand than authorized by the table of organization. The excess in aircraft assignments does not offer any difficulties in other maintenance specialties and no increase in personnel is needed.

Experience has proven that the maintenance responsibility should be under the Squadron Commander, and not a Base Engineering Section. Initiative, experience and esprit de corps are direct benefits gained by the friendly competition between maintenance men in the different squadrons of the group as they labor in adverse conditions at various times of the aircraft in the air. The Squadron Commander can more intelligently perform his duty as advisor and consultant on mission planning if he is familiar with the engineering aspects of the B-29. In this connection it is interesting to note that the pilot caliber of the men in the XI Bomb Squadron had an increased efficiency of the B-29 even when it was an engine... question mark. Six... months of practical maintenance... the ground, and... of the 45th Bomb... after an established... new units yet to... in the States.

Work of the Squadron has been generally... the past year... ver, certain factors... at... morale...

SECRET

SECRET

The very nature of the organization of the 47th Bombardment Group, which was selected with a level of experience in the service of the United States Army, with a continuous overseas combat crew, was particularly apparent in April 1944, promotions have been made particularly for enlisted men. With an overlay of interest in the unit, which has been made in the Table of Organization for the unit, and a desire to call for higher grades . . . for an example, promotion.

Objections in promoting officers that did have position vacancies was a major factor. The "broken" policy was put into effect to promote color in the organization reported for overseas service with the explanation that it was desired for a man to prove himself worthy, although the personnel were of higher experience in flying time and grade than the majority of organizations leaving for overseas service. When promotion recommendations were accepted once again, they were sometimes returned for consideration of an error in submission due to a subsequent change of policy, such as an explicit new form. Policy was inconsistent. Some promotions were put six weeks pending a policy establishment. Some promotions, even in such circumstances, had to be submitted on several different occasions, and the final recommendation was policy directed to be submitted on a date which was in accordance with the policy established for the first time. On the whole, the type of condition in the administrative procedure of command the Squadron only had one officer promotion from November 1943 to July 1944. The difficulties of administrative procedure were easily understood, due to the nature and nature of organization, yet morale suffered noticeably because on the face of things it seemed as if there existed a reluctance to promote.

Awards and decorations, and rotation were other items that entered into the morale picture. All men in the Squadron had worked hard. With an untried weapon flying at the end of the war's longest supply line, skill and improvisation licked numerous obstacles. No one of them remained their accomplishments, but their feeling of pride, as in all squadrons of the Squadron, was justified in view of terrain, weather and performance and operation of the aircraft difficulties. Combat missions carried them to Japan, Manchuria, China, Formosa, Malaya, Sumatra, Java, Borneo and French Indo-China. Bombing, navigation, engineering, gunnery, radar and discipline operation were tested from one extreme to the other. Every territory and proposition became a proving ground as the test program produced volumes of data all important to the future of the air war against Japan. There seemed to be only one way to recognize the overall contribution of the pioneer officers of the 47th Bombardment Group who are still producing cumulative "bangs" . . . a Presidential Citation. Certainly no unit could be more deserving of such recognition.

Personnel:

- 1st Lt. [Name] and 1st Lt. [Name] returned from the General Hospital at Calcutta and were once again assigned to the Squadron.

SECRET

Report, with Bomb Sq. 1 Dec thru 31 Dec 44. Lt Col [redacted], Cont'd

December - Two new replacement combat crews joined the organization having just arrived from the States. The following named personnel were assigned:

| | |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| 1st Lt MILLS L. KANE | Major [redacted] [redacted] JR |
| 2nd Lt [redacted] LAMON | 1st Lt [redacted] COVER |
| 2nd Lt [redacted] N. ORSKOV JR | 1st Lt [redacted] ALBORN |
| 2nd Lt [redacted] MIZZA | 1st Lt [redacted] [redacted] |
| Sgt Joseph D. Valley | 1st Lt [redacted] A. DE LAIS |
| S Sgt [redacted] [redacted] | Sgt [redacted] S. Frayer |
| Cpl [redacted] J. Kelf | Cpl [redacted] J. Lamb |
| Cpl [redacted] r. Becker | Sgt [redacted] J. Anthony |
| Cpl [redacted] Gally | Sgt [redacted] K. Cairn |
| Cpl [redacted] Beckley | Sgt [redacted] J. Hanson |
| Cpl [redacted] Radlofsky | |

December - Captain [redacted] [redacted] returned to the unit from the hospital at Chengde.

17 December - 1st Lt [redacted] [redacted] was assigned to the Squadron as Assistant Intelligence Officer. [redacted] transfer route from the 450th Bomb Group.

17 December - Captain [redacted] J. [redacted] and crew [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] from mission of 14 December.

20 December - Captain [redacted] [redacted] departed the States with a medical transfer. [redacted] knee injury sustained [redacted] [redacted] mission of 20 August. [redacted] left his post [redacted] before he left. Captain [redacted] and Major [redacted] [redacted] with the Distinguished Flying Cross earned for meritorious [redacted] on the flight in August.

23 December - Captain [redacted] A [redacted] was killed in an airplane crash at [redacted]. Captain [redacted] was a [redacted] [redacted] had been on [redacted] at the control center in the forward [redacted].

27 December - Major [redacted] E. MOSS departed for [redacted] to assume command of the Forward Area 40th Group Detachment [redacted] officers and enlisted men. On 30 December he was officially transferred to Headquarters 40th Bomb Group. He replaced Lt Col [redacted] [redacted] who returned to the States for medical reasons.

Strength of the Squadron as of the [redacted] ending of the month are indicated below and on the following [redacted].

1 December 1944

[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]