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FOUR FIFTH BOUND VOLUME
Office of the Historians Officer

AFC Number 031
14 February 1945

ASIAN VICTORY

1 December thru 31 December 1944

General:

December marked the calendar termination of the year 1944, the year which at its beginning had been publicly endorsed both officially and unofficially as the "Year of Victory". The validity of such speculations had been proven, yet the year brought the Allies into a closer and unrestricted view of ultimate victory.

While American, British, Canadian, French and Russian armies pushed and shoved the Germans back into the corner of Germany itself, the war against Japan had been moved over from a series of raiding maneuvers to a strong offensive program. The Japs were withdrawing from China and the Indo-China road was first ready to be opened. Guided and protected by the tremendous American naval power of the 3rd and 7th Fleets, General SUGIMOTO authorized and covered with amazing audacity, by a series of leap frog amphibious movements, into the heart of the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. Iwakuni, Gushikawa and other islands in the Japanese had been wrested from the enemy and now served as the jumping off point for B-29 attacks on Japan and B-24 operations on the same islands and hunting Jap shipping. The overall picture of allied movements to final victory in the Pacific was watched with amazement by civilians back home as well as by the men in the India-China and China theaters, who knew full well the tremendous problem of supply that had to be licked continually to move supplies such moves.

Men in the Squadron, while vitally concerned in the overall Pacific picture, were primarily interested in B-29 operations of the XX Bomber Command. Looking back over the just eight months of combat activity they could justifiably be proud of their accomplishments in the face of countless obstacles. Their work and sweat as a part of the command's efforts had produced a "know-how" for the 29 crews that were being trained to hit with regularity at the heart of Japanese industrial strength. No one but the two who flew the early missions of these first few months could tell the story of the courage and determination that was needed to make possible the heart-warming news to the allied world, "B-29 Superfortresses of the XX Bomber Command today bombed industrial installations on the island of KYUSHU on the Japanese mainland". Targets in CHINA, INDIA, JAPAN,

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January, 45th Bomb Gp., 1 Dec thru 31 Dec 44, 14 Feb 45, Cont'd.

YEN LOU, CHINA, THAILAND, SINGAPORE and INDIA were struck during the year, none of which had never felt the weight of allied bombs. In addition the ~~29~~ photo-recon planes had caught hundreds of the installations in its eyes and furnished countless pieces of information to the Planning Division of the Joint Commands.

None of the accomplishments had been made without a price. Good friend and good men had paid with the greatest price possible - - - their lives. Christmas Day rolled around it was occasion to solemnly hope and pray that their sacrifice had not been in vain - - - that the prayer of "Peace on earth, good will to men" would be answered in the new year of 1945.

Operations

Combat:

The first mission for the month of December appropriately fell on 7 December, third anniversary of the Jap sneak attack on Pearl Harbor, HAWAII. The show was against the aircraft factory at SHIJIANG, YANCHUNHUA. Aircraft from the Squadron started moving to the forward area on 2 December and by 3 December eight (8) planes were at ~~4-1~~ available for the mission.

In the afternoon of 3 December briefing was held and the target was announced to the aircraft factory at CHONGMING, JAPAN. The weather conditions at the time were in question. After the briefing was concluded all the crews ate supper and went to bed for a few hours sleep before take-off time. Just before time to get up word came through the barracks that the mission had been called off. On the following two consecutive nights the weather forecast at the last minute indicated that CHONGMING would be overcast and unsuitable for precision bombing. On each occasion the mission was postponed until before the crews were scheduled to awake.

Finally on 6 December the location of the primary target was changed to the aircraft factory at YUNDEE, YANCHUNHUA. With the weather prognosis favorable the briefing and take-off went off without a hitch. Twenty-nine (29) aircraft were parked in the near-freezing weather on the "doughnut" at ~~4-1~~ and available for the mission. Starting at 061930Z a total of 27 aircraft were airborne, the last one taking off at 062025Z. The aircraft were ground aborts due to mechanical difficulties encountered on the run-up.

At eight (8) aircraft of the 45th Bomb Squadron were airborne and were a part of the 23 aircraft of the 40th Bomb Group to reach the primary target and which bombed in two formations. The first formation consisting of 12 aircraft from the 40th Bomb Group and one each from the 40th and 46th Bombed Groups, approximately 22,000' Ind at 0627Z with good observed results which were confirmed by strike photos. The center of the bomb pattern was somewhat to

CONFIDENTIAL 2000 words Sec Turn 1 Dec 44. 14 Feb 45. cont'd.

the flight at the aiming point, but considerable damage was believed inflicted. At strike distance also revealed the beginning of a triple screen by the enemy which quickly and effectively blanketed the target area including the arsenal at LUKDEB. The remaining 11 aircraft arrived over the target approximately 20 minutes later at which time the target was completely covered by the above mentioned snow screen. It was believed that most bombs from this formation fell in the 4th yards considerably south of the target area due to some aircraft deviation, presumably by accident. The other aircraft in the formation had very considerable amounts of ice and frost on the windows and probably started falling following the sequential release.

Heavy anti-aircraft position over the primary target was moderate. The first 4 aircraft from enemy fighters waiting for them over the target. When it was evident that the formation was proceeding to LUKDEB the enemy immediately reversed and were in position over SUKUSN for the later formations. Most batteries were not closely spaced here, being concentrated around 300 yards. 44th Bomb Group aircraft claimed a total of three destroyed, one probably destroyed and six damaged enemy aircraft.

At aircraft time the weather was inaccurate at the primary target. Weather over the primary target was GAWU.

The aircraft due to mechanical difficulties bombed the secondary target with no observed results. Weather was about 3/10 cloud covered and no enemy fighters or antiaircraft fire were encountered.

The aircraft due to mechanical difficulty was forced to jettison.

Aircraft #363 of the 44th Bomb Squadron was hit by enemy fighters over the primary target and was being escorted back to base by aircraft #729 and #734. Enroute the three plane formation was subjected to another fighter attack during which #363 was further damaged. At 0925Z at position 36°30'N-113°0'S the crew of #363 were forced to abandon the aircraft when the prop on #1 engine flew off. Eleven chutes were seen to open and the aircraft exploded against the side of a mountain shortly thereafter.

Several facts stood out in connection with the mission. First a great variety of enemy fighters were encountered. Fractionally all types, even including obsolete CLAUDES and VALS with fixed landing gear were reported along with the latest and most modern types of fighters. Secondly, severe icing and frosting on the windows in the nose section presented a serious problem for accurate bombing. De-icing and opening the cockpit windows did not seem to help. Lt "Uncle" LORTON flying in #779 kept a small hole about 3" x 6" scraped clean in order to be able to see the bombs from the lead plane iron. Not only is icing a problem that affects bombing, it is also a hazard when enemy fighter attacks come from the frontal quarter, when clear vision

From: Boris Angelov
Time: 2002-12-16 03:43:39
Text: Hello,

I created a new 4cindexer.pl and started it from the SSH. I suppose it works OK, but i'd like you to test it. The script uses 4cconf.pl. The only thing I modified were the script paths.
The script took from 5 to 10 % CPU resource.

To test DBoard I need something which gives an error like an Web page or shell script.

brgds
HC-Support

SECRET

REF ID: A6542 202500Z NOV 64 INFO TO HQ, INT'D.

| Aircraft | Name | Time | Flight hour |
|------------------------|--------|-----------------------|-------------|
| Aircraft #42-24406 | LUDDEK | | |
| 2nd Lt ROSEY, J. C. | (F) | S Sgt SATION, J T | (F) |
| 1st Lt CHAMBERS, E F. | (CP) | S Sgt DeGraw, J H | (LG) |
| 1st Lt DAVIS, G J | (S) | S Sgt Kesteloot, R T | (LG) |
| 1st Lt DAVIS, L J | (S) | S Sgt DeBridge, A L | (LG) |
| 2nd Lt JAMESON, G L | (E) | Sgt Stewart, J | (V) |
| | | T Sgt Hall, G M, J | (TG) |
| | | Sgt Keisler, J | (F) |
| Aircraft #42-24407 | LUDDEK | | 14:15 hours |
| 1st Lt COLEMAN, R J | (F) | Sgt Hutchinson, J | (LG) |
| 1st Lt CHAMBERS, J. A. | (CP) | Sgt Turner, C E | (LG) |
| 2nd Lt HEDDER, R J | (F) | Sgt Bass, A G | (LG) |
| 2nd Lt POLINSKY, J | (S) | T Sgt Blazekard, C G | (TG) |
| F/O HANSEN, A J | (E) | Cpl Johnson, C G | (V) |
| Aircraft #42-24407 | LUDDEK | | 15:35 hours |
| 2nd Lt WOOD, R J | (F) | Sgt Hauckecker, R A | (S) |
| 1st Lt CONLEY, | (CP) | S Sgt Greenfield, C S | (CPG) |
| 1st Lt POLINSKY, J A | (E) | S Sgt Sonrage, C R | (LG) |
| 1st Lt LUSTIG, J A | (S) | S Sgt Tucker, A D | (LG) |
| 1st Lt BRUNCO, J P | (I) | T Sgt Roberts, C F | (TG) |
| 1st Lt HAGERTY, J A | (E) | | |
| Aircraft #42-24579 | LUDDEK | | 15:10 hours |
| Maj LATIMER, T V | (P) | T Sgt Thompson, F H | (S) |
| Capt HILLIS, H E | (CP) | S Sgt Shole, H A | (LG) |
| Capt LE CRANZ, H B | (N) | S Sgt McBride, L | (LG) |
| 1st Lt MCINTOSH, N H | (S) | S Sgt McInerny, C P | (CPG) |
| 1st Lt KINNEBERG, E F | (V) | S Sgt Glover, D C | (LG) |
| F/O GRACE, L L | (PE) | | |
| Capt LONAN, C P | (X) | | |
| Aircraft #42-6913 | LUDDEK | | 15:15 hours |
| Capt DILLOM, J J | (P) | S Sgt Anthony, F J | (S) |
| 1st Lt SANFORD, E F | (CP) | S Sgt De Mayo, F F | (CPG) |
| Capt BAKER, H B | (N) | Sgt Gioan, A S | (LG) |
| 1st Lt COFF, C H | (S) | Sgt Johnson, C F | (LG) |
| 1st Lt WORRELL, L A | (PE) | Sgt Martin, A A | (TG) |
| | | Sgt Allen, C E | (S) |

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History, 45th Bomb Sq, 1 Dec thru 31 Dec 44, 14 Feb 45, Cont'd.

Seven days after the MCKEEEN mission the second mission to be conducted in December was directed against the Rama VI HI bridge at BANGKOK, THAILAND. Briefing was held in the early evening hours of 13 December in the Group War Room. Little did anyone realize how disastrous the results of the mission would be as the primary target was announced. The attack would certainly not be a "milk run", but for crews who had seen the opposition the enemy offered over JAPAN and MANCHURIA the mission was more or less routine after the heavy take-off in darkness had been accomplished.

The mission began when the first aircraft was airborne at 132117Z. Twelve aircraft, of which four were 45th Bomb Squadron planes took off, the last at 132139Z.

Of the 12 aircraft airborne 11 proceeded to the primary target, but found that cloud cover obscured the target. No antiaircraft fire or fighters were encountered. Two bombing runs were made in an attempt to carry out visual bombing, but it was not possible to see the bridge, so the formation proceeded to the designated IP (KAOOLMUNG ISLAND) for the secondary target, the Central Air Station and Yards at CHIANGMAI, THAILAND. An excellent bombing run was made in CAVU weather at 20,000' with "bombs away" at 0004Z.

Just a few seconds after bombs were dropped the formation was suddenly thrown into confusion and out of control by a violent explosion in the air. The cause of the explosion was not definitely identified, but all indications pointed to the fact that two or more of the 500 lb GP bombs had detonated a few seconds after they were released. Some crew members stated that intense predicted concentrations of flak was seen at the same moment. Theory was also advanced that an antiaircraft projectile might have made a direct hit on a bomb.

Regardless of the cause the experience was a strange and a costly one. One aircraft was seen to flip over on its back and dived towards the ground in flame. Another aircraft had a wing on fire and was seen out of control. One aircraft is missing altogether and one is presumed to have been abandoned approximately 100 miles west of BANGKOK. All aircraft that returned to base bore marks of damage.

The co-pilot of aircraft #506 stated that he observed #501 flip over on its back belching flame and out of control. Lt Col LEE COUGHLIN, commander of the 45th Bomb Squadron in #729 reported that he was in radio contact with #574 directly after the accident. Capt ROBERT SIANKS of #574 wanted to bail out right away, but Col COUGHLIN told him to wait until the last minute in an effort to get back to the coast. About 25 minutes after leaving the target area Col COUGHLIN was once again in contact with #574 at which time Capt SIANKS stated he was going to have to bail out and gave his position as approximately 100 miles west of BANGKOK. There was no further contact.

At 0004Z the 11k aircraft over the secondary target of KAOOLMUNG had made their return directly to base. The aircraft were not damaged and were able to bring them in, the aircraft landed at 0017Z.

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SAFETY, 1945 COMB SG, 1 Dec thru 31 Dec 44, 14 Feb 45, cont'd.

and was further damaged when it ran off the end of the runway. Four aircraft, as stated before are missing. Aircraft #631 and #574 were lost from the 45th Bomb Squadron. Of the two other Squadron planes on the mission, aircraft #407 landed at CHITTACONG and #559 due to loss of one engine bailed the last resort target at BASSAKH. Photo strike photos revealed excellent bombing results. No antiaircraft fire or fighters were encountered.

Members of the Squadron were stunned by the losses sustained over the yard little, if any, damage was obtained from the last mission notes, although it was revealed that excellent bombing had been done. A very compact pattern measuring only 1600' across was centered squarely on the yard. Damage resulting was heavy and included the virtual destruction of the AA station, four passenger loading platforms, five receiving sheds, and several small miscellaneous shops. Out of a total of 15 lines through the yard 11 were cut by one or more hits and the remaining were at least temporarily blocked by wreckage. Thirty-five railroad stock were either destroyed or damaged and 60 more probably damaged.

Photo cover of BANGKOK revealed that formations of the other three aircraft in the XX Bomber Command missed the bridge. To the 40th Bomb Group went credit for the only successful bombing of the day.

Four members from the 45th Bomb Squadron that flew on the mission are named below:

| | | |
|---------------------|---------|--------------------------|
| Aircraft #42-24407 | RANGOON | 10:40 hours |
| Capt BOSS, R E | (P) | S Sgt Hettmeyer, F W (R) |
| 1st Lt CONLEY, R W | (CP) | S Sgt Gedney, L F (CFC) |
| 1st Lt LUSIG, D M | (N) | S Sgt Tucker, R S (LG) |
| 1st Lt POLLARD, R L | (B) | S Sgt George, J R (RG) |
| 1st Lt BRUSCO, J P | (V) | T Sgt Liberts, A F (TC) |
| F/O HIGHLIGHT, J D | (E) | |

| | | |
|------------------------|---------|--------------------------|
| Aircraft #42-24574 | RANGOON | Entire Crew missing |
| Capt SHANKS, R C | (P) | S Sgt Majors, F T (R) |
| 1st Lt FLETCHER, H E | (CP) | S Sgt Sommers, L J (V) |
| 2nd Lt COHRAN, J C | (N) | S Sgt Galesky, R P (CFC) |
| 2nd Lt BENEDICT, G R | (B) | S Sgt Lantz, W R (RG) |
| 2nd Lt BIRMINGHAM, G M | (E) | S Sgt Madole, A H J (LG) |
| | | T Sgt Pasterzi, S S (TC) |

| | | |
|-----------------------|---------|------------------------|
| Aircraft #42-93831 | RANGOON | Entire Crew missing |
| 1st Lt AGELIN, W K | (P) | Sgt Brooks, R W (R) |
| 1st Lt PAUL, G B | (CP) | Sgt Dalton, R E (V) |
| 2nd Lt LAWRENCE, R | (N) | Sgt Hopking, V L (CFC) |
| 2nd Lt MC DIVISION, B | (B) | Sgt Mcatee, L I (RG) |
| 2nd Lt PARHAMER, W S | (E) | Sgt McLean, K A (LG) |
| | | Sgt Madison, A A (TC) |

CHAPTER I

January, 1945 (Book 2), 1 Dec thru 31 Dec 44, 1st Group, Comptd.

Aircr ft 4.2-43079 15:15M (LRT) Total hours

| | | | |
|-----------------------|------|--------------------|-----|
| Capt HANSON, J L | (c) | S Sgt Davis, A A | (c) |
| 1st Lt HIX, A | (CP) | Sgt FORD, J A | (c) |
| 1st Lt LEWIS, J | (f) | S Sgt FURR, S G | (c) |
| 1st Lt MC DOWELL, J L | (g) | S Sgt JOHNSON, L L | (c) |
| C/0 PELLMAS, J | (h) | S Sgt RAYSON, R D | (c) |
| Capt MILL, J A | (k) | S Sgt SALTERI, J L | (c) |

In the following day (12 Dec) Capt CHADDELL and his crew took off early in the morning and conducted a search mission for aircraft #574. The probable position of the bail out was covered thoroughly, but no trace of plane wreckage or crew members could be found. However, it remained lost somehow, somewhere the crew was safe on the ground and making their way to the coast where the five British naval patrols might see them and effect rescue.

Also on 15 December a field order came in directing the movement of aircraft to the forward area. On 17 December the Group dispatched 17 B-29 aircraft to I-1, five of which were 45th Bomb Squadron planes. The next few days were busy ones for crew members who were in CHINA.

Starting at 1743Z a total of 16 aircraft were airborne to attack AIR MARI and were en route at the river port of HANAU, C.I.A. One aircraft was a ground loss because of mechanical difficulty. All five of the 45th Squadron aircraft were airborne and successfully bombed the primary target.

Capt RICHARD SIEBACH and crew in #579 led a formation of 13 aircraft while two other aircraft followed the lead formation over the target one minute later. One aircraft had been unable to rejoin its leading group and returned to A-1 with full bomb load.

The 1st Group aircraft bombing HANAU released a total of 1002 K-47 and 37 K-76 type bombs. Both type bombs were fused instantaneous nose and non-delay tail. Weather over the target was CAVU, but a 75 knot headwind was encountered at the bombing altitude of 16,000'. The wind, plus the fact that the trail value of the K-47 bomb was so excessive for the bomb sight that Capt RICHARD SIEBACH had to aim 1700' over the selected aiming point in order to compensate for his deficiency, resulted in a very wide dispersion of the bombs.

Due to the extreme trail, cameras in the aircraft could not be tilted back far enough to obtain adequate strike photo coverage. However with anti-aircraft fire heavier and fighter opposition weak, an excellent bomb run was made. As the aircraft left the target numerous fires and great quantities of smoke were seen which showed the bombs had gone into the target. All aircraft returned safely to A-1 with the last plane down at 1800Z.

The HANAU mission was short, much to the crews liking. Of most value was the fact that the target was important to the Japs - - - - but it was

CHART

Aircraft 42-24738 1400 hours 26 Dec 64, Hanoi, Vietnam

On PAF or visual ground. An assessment of damage to aircraft, or remaining wreckage and personnel, was being forwarded. The destruction over the target area covered a wide area, starting point to point, and point to center. A runway 10R had been destroyed. District 1000, about 1000' above sea level, had apparently suffered a direct hit. The local fire department had been unable to extinguish the flames due to lack of water. The aircraft could now return to the "safe" flight of mines and operations. 0000 - 420.

Flight mission 1400 hours to the units previously listed on the chart.

Aircraft 42-24739 1400 hours

| | | TIME | |
|-----------------------|------|----------------------|-----|
| 2nd Lt. RICHARDSON, C | (P) | T Sgt. Lyle, T G | (A) |
| 1st Lt. GIBSON, C | (CP) | T Sgt. Springer, A L | (B) |
| 2nd Lt. COLEMAN, C | (S) | T Sgt. Swindell, S J | (C) |
| 2nd Lt. GIBSON, C | (B) | S Sgt. Baker, C J | (D) |
| 2nd Lt. COLEMAN, C | (V) | S Sgt. Hodge, C J | (E) |
| C O. GIBSON, C | (PC) | | |

Aircraft 42-24739 1400 hours

| | | TIME | |
|--------------------|------|-------------------------|-----|
| 2nd Lt. AXEL, C | (A) | S Sgt. Davis, C J | (A) |
| 1st Lt. AX, C | (CP) | S Sgt. Major, C J | (B) |
| 1st Lt. COLEMAN, C | (S) | S Sgt. Farrow, C J | (C) |
| 1st Lt. COLEMAN, C | (B) | S Sgt. Johnston, C L | (D) |
| C O. PARISH, C | (PC) | S Sgt. Rawson, C J | (E) |
| | | S Sgt. Satterfield, C L | (F) |

Aircraft 42-24736 1400 hours

| | | TIME | |
|-----------------------|------|-----------------------|-----|
| 2nd Lt. KIRKLAND, C A | (P) | S Sgt. Simons, C J | (A) |
| 1st Lt. COYNE, C A | (CP) | S Sgt. Driscoll, C A | (B) |
| 1st Lt. DOVA, C J | (S) | S Sgt. Kehlhofer, C P | (C) |
| 1st Lt. DAVIS, C J | (B) | S Sgt. Dodrige, C L | (D) |
| 2nd Lt. JAMESON, C J | (V) | Sgt. Stewart, C D | (E) |
| | | S Sgt. Burns, C J | (F) |

Aircraft 42-24738 1400 hours

| | | TIME | |
|----------------------|------|----------------------|-----|
| 2nd Lt. BOSS, C | (P) | T Sgt. Klyver, C V | (A) |
| 1st Lt. ELLIOTT, C A | (CP) | S Sgt. Seiney, C F | (B) |
| 1st Lt. LOVING, C | (S) | S Sgt. Atchison, C A | (C) |
| 1st Lt. MILLER, C | (B) | S Sgt. Dahlia, C | (D) |
| 1st Lt. MURPHY, C | (V) | T Sgt. Ode, C A | (E) |
| C O. WILHELM, C D | (PC) | | |

~~SECRET~~

11. 4700 2200 202nd Gp, 1, 200 2200 21 Dec 44, 1-2000, 202nd

Aircraft numbered 1 to 12 in order of take off.

| Aircraft Number | To RD | Time Hours |
|---------------------------|-------|----------------------------|
| Capt. J. M. WOOLSTY | (P) | 1 Sgt. JACKSON, A.J. (P) |
| 1st Lt. HARRIS, C.A. | (CP) | 1 Sgt. COVETTE, C.L. (P) |
| 1st Lt. KELLY, C.A. | (S) | 3 Sgt. TRICE, T.C. (P) |
| 1st Lt. S. M. DAVIS, C.A. | (S) | 3 Sgt. BOYER, C.J. (P) |
| 1st Lt. RUDKIN, C.A. | (CP) | Sgt. COOPER, C.H. (P) |
| | | S Sgt. BLENKIEWICZ, S. (P) |

It was about 11 AM after noon when the planes returned to N-1 from mission. After interrogations and lunch, flight jackets were provided for each of the members crew. It was announced that a briefing would be held at a later hour than usual with another briefing continuation directly thereafter.

At the briefing the target was announced to be the old 4. vorite, the aircraft factory at SHANGHAI, JAPAN. Weather prognosis was that China would be partially cloud covered, with the hope that visual bombing could be accomplished.

Take off began at 1800Z. A total of 12 aircraft from the Group were airborne with the last aircraft taking off at 1/2001Z. Six (6) of the 12 aircraft were Squadron planes - - - the same five that were on the NAMU mission plus #739 which had arrived at N-1 that afternoon.

A total of 12 light aircraft of which five were from the Squadron, succeeded in reaching the primary target in formation. Major MCCORMICK and crew in #579 were once again in the leadings position released a total of 41 #500 H-64 and 45 #500 H-76 type bombs on CHUNG at 0150Z from 22000 feet. The H-64 bombs were fused .1 sec nose and .025 sec tail delay and the H-76 bombs were fused instantaneous nose and non-delay tail. The weather was 10/10 undercast necessitating the use of radar to make the bomb run and release. Antiaircraft fire was meager and inaccurate and only weak fighter opposition was encountered.

One aircraft was unable to join the 40th bomb group formation and finally joined a seven plane formation of the 402nd Group. After leaving the IP the formation commander of that Group decided against bombing the primary target due to the undercast and the formation proceeded to SHANGHAI, the secondary target, and bombed visually from 20000 feet with good observed results. Antiaircraft fire was meager and inaccurate and fighter opposition was weak.

One aircraft, unable to join any formation, proceeded to bomb SHANGHAI from 22000 feet with good observed results encountering no opposition.

Another aircraft due to mechanical difficulties bombed the target of last resort from 20000 feet with good results encountering no opposition.

Aircraft #406 with Captain JAMES WOOLSTY and crew on board had to be abandoned in the vicinity of ANHUA shortly after take off. Fire broke out in either the top cylinders or the accessories section of #1 engine, the fire was a flashing type proceeded by backfiring with the engine running.

CHAPTER I

1944, April 20, 1 Dec thru 30 Dec., 1945, 1000 hrs, 1000 hrs, 1000 hrs

very rough. Captain R.J.S.Y reduced his speed on 1 engine for about 30 seconds and then the backfiring stopped and he could fly again. Once again the backfiring started and the aircraft continued to run rough. tried to fly over it but was unable to do so. A large amount of smoke oil was seen coming from the engine, so the tanks were jettisoned. About 15 minutes passed after which the aircraft impacted. Airspeed was reduced to 170 mph and increased power was added on the second engine (R-18) and course taken for Alton in order to make an emergency landing. Captain R.J.S.Y stated he was just able to maintain altitude and couldn't see that 1 engine was losing oil rapidly. Shortly thereafter the oil ran out of the tank and all the instruments on the front out. An additional five minutes of prop stalling to run away and credits a terrific whine which drowned out conversation over the intercom and started a violent vibration on the left wing. Captain R.J.S.Y then gave the order to leave aircraft. Position at time of bail out was approximately 30 miles northeast of Alton.

All crew members landed in close proximity of one another. There was only minor injuries. They all made the long journey to Alton, IL by boat the night. The next day (20 Dec) we flew via pipeline to a P-47 and took back to Alton.

Except exception of aircraft #42-24466 all planes on the mission returned to Alton.

Initial flights are the names of the 1st. pos. squadron that flew on the mission:

Aircraft #4 - 24466 (Bailed out near Alton) 2:51 hours

| | | | |
|-----------------------|------|----------------------|-----|
| Capt. MULSEY, G.A. | (P) | Sgt. Smith, J.T. | (P) |
| 1st Lt. COVET, L.L. | (CP) | Sgt. Townsend, F.H. | (P) |
| 1st Lt. JOVA, S.J. | (N) | Sgt. Kestrel, F.P. | (P) |
| 1st Lt. DAVID, L.G. | (B) | Sgt. Donbridge, R.L. | (P) |
| 2nd Lt. JAMESON, G.J. | (FE) | Sgt. Stewart, W.B. | (P) |
| | | Sgt. Burns, T.J. | (P) |

Aircraft #42-24739 OMBRA 1:00 hours

| | | | |
|-------------------------|------|---------------------|-----|
| Capt. GORDON, J.H. | (P) | Sgt. Kosinski, S.Y. | (P) |
| 1st Lt. HILL, A.L. | (CP) | Sgt. Adamson, A.P. | (P) |
| 1st Lt. VOLKEMUTH, H.F. | (N) | Sgt. Shebik, M.P. | (P) |
| 1st Lt. REEDMAN, F.J. | (B) | Sgt. Morris, F.L. | (P) |
| 1st Lt. ROSENBLUM, E.S. | (FE) | Sgt. Freeman, G.A. | (P) |
| 2nd Lt. HILL, E.B. | (V) | Cpl. Claypool, A.B. | (P) |

Aircraft #4 - 24572 OMBRA 1:00 hours

| | | | |
|--------------------------|------|---------------------|-----|
| Capt. COOPER, A.H. | (P) | Sgt. Lyle, F.O. | (P) |
| 1st Lt. SANDSTEDT, R.P. | (CP) | Sgt. Spurgeon, S.L. | (P) |
| Capt. MASTERS, D.F. | (N) | Sgt. Swindell, W.S. | (P) |
| Capt. SEBBERTSEN, A.J.E. | (B) | Sgt. Baker, G.J. | (P) |

DECLINE

Victory, 195, cont. Sq., 1 Dec thru 21 Dec 44, 1 Feb 45, forward

| | | |
|--|---|---|
| Aircraft #4-36779 (cont'd) | Oldfield | 14:40 hours |
| Lst Lt BODD, L F F/O GULI, A L | (V) (P) | Capt. Hubbard, J. R. (R) |
| Aircraft #4-36780 - CHINA | | 15:25 hours |
| Capt. MALLIN, J. G. 1st Lt HAI, W. T. S. 1st Lt BURKE, J. A. 2nd Lt BLOOMFIELD, J. M. 1st Lt MANN, J. M. | (P) (CP) (P) (P) (P) | Sgt Stockton, J. I. (R) Sgt Bennett, W. H. (CP) Sgt Trace, W. H. (P) Sgt Love, P. J. (P) Sgt Vogel, W. B. (R) Sgt Sienkiewicz, S. V. (V) |
| Aircraft #4-36780 - CHINA | | 14:45 hours |
| Wg. Off. KEMP, A. C. 1st Lt ALLEN, J. H. 1st Lt MCGEE, D. M. 1st Lt SHAW, C. S. 1st Lt TALMOR, R. C. F/O KIRKETT, J. D. | (P) (CP) (P) (P) (P) (P) | Sgt Kilver, A. V. (R) Sgt McKinley, L. F. (CP) Sgt Austin, C. H. (P) Sgt Lucius, J. (R) Sgt Cox, J. G. (P) |
| Aircraft #4-3659 - CHINA | | 14:50 hours |
| Capt. NELSON, C. W. 1st Lt HIX, R. A. 1st Lt JONES, W. M. 1st Lt GALLAGHER, W. L. F/O MITRAS, J. - | (P) (P) (P) (P) (P) | Sgt Davis, S. M. (R) Sgt Wagner, S. A. (V) Sgt Parrar, S. G. (CP) Sgt Johnston, L. L. (P) Sgt Rawson, H. D. (R) Sgt Setterfield, J. L. (R) |

That night a "three bell" alert was called for A-1 by Fighter Compt. Colonel GUARD, Group Commander, gave orders for several planes to be fueled bombs up that day to take off and return to India immediately. Aircraft #776, manned by Captain MALLIN, BALL and crew, was a Squadron plane among those that took off. Due to the rush the take off was accomplished without first having transferred the gas in the bomb bay tanks to the wing tanks, since it was believed that this could be done in flight.

However, as soon as the aircraft had settled on course and an attempt made to transfer fuel, the system was found to be inoperative. All valves were packed and fuses were changed but the system still wouldn't work. Captain Ball then ordered the bomb load salvoed and the aircraft lightened by jettisoning all excess equipment, and decided to make an emergency landing at YUN AN II, since he had ample gas in the wing tanks to reach that point. He instructed the radio operator to contact that station at YUN AN II. After repeated attempts, the radio operator was unable to get through. When #776 arrived over the area of YUN AN II there was a solid blackcasta

SECRET

Major, 25th BOMB GR. Home thru 31 Dec 44. 1000 ft., 1000 ft.

With no radio contact or other navigational aids available, Captain HAI decided to try to land the field at HANING.

The radio operator was unable to contact HANING so switched to the VHF frequency and tried to contact JORDAN and TAYLOR, but got no response. At about 1450Z #1 engine started cutting out and soon quit due to lack of gas. At 1453Z #2 engine did likewise. Captain HAI stated that the aircraft behaved well on the remaining two engines and that he was able to even climb little altitude using both #2. Shortly after our station at FARE ABLE (PAKAWANG) and asked him to relay his emergency message to HANING. While in contact with HANING #2 engine started cutting out, so Captain HAI gave priority to start on the aircraft. The radio operator added "tailin' out" to his message.

All crew members bailed out and although it was dark and in rough country, no one was injured upon hitting the ground. The crew landed in two separate groups of five and seven men respectively. Travelling in two parties the next day both were sighted by #1 of the reserve SQUADRON which was en route back as well as a staged plane. They then proceeded to HANING. At the end of 21 December all crew members were in HANING, having been aided successfully by friendly Chinese along the way.

From HANING the entire crew proceeded by truck on carrier road to the airfield near to HANING and from there were transported by truck to HANING and then to HANING by truck. On Christmas Day the plane was flown to HANING airfield at HANING by #1, then taken by truck to HANING, by #1 to HANING, then by an aircraft of #1 group to #1 on 20 December.

Upon the arrival home they were told that a north east monsoon had actually begun during the alert which they impacted the quick return. However, it had only one engine run which caused them to take up the runway, but this was quickly repaired. No personnel or communications were damaged.

The vicious cycle of bail outs continued on when the first in the series occurred on the night of 20 December. Major A. L. TAYLOR, #1 crew was carrying aircraft #51, a 25th Bomb Squadron pilot, back to #1 when it happened.

First leg of the flight was from #1 to HANING, China and then course was taken for YUNNAN, China. Along however the darkness forced the use of DR navigation and metro data given to the crew at #1. In addition the radio compass was oscillating and a bit and wasn't considered reliable. On the #1 position of HANING, course was altered to HANING, China.

Upon the aircraft crossed the Giandong River a fix was obtained with radar which indicated they were somewhat north of course. The corrected course took them about 30 miles north of HANING. The copilot and radar operator had checked the IFF several times to make sure it was operating, which it was.

On approximately north of HANING, the bombardier reported unreliable

SECRET

1. 100 sec 2. 100 sec 3. 100 sec 4. 100 sec 5. 100 sec

The results were discussed below. Although the day was 2030, the discussion was overruled on point of order.

... I have a plan to utilize ripples with one
big noticeable crowd that anything is possible. The
problem is very serious but very anxious that the ripples will
begin, probably coming from an area in the winter.

1000, 1960, about 100 m right inboard wing section. All four wings were cut and were in relatively good condition. The two outermost wings had the serial number 20330, the rudder, all four stabilizers, and the left wing had the serial number 20330, west of Port Moresby. It was noted that the aircraft had been heavily damaged by ground fire.

... and effects of the new laws about the BSA's... and the
limits of your own use of the BSA's ideas... it turned up

... 100 feet from the bridge. A woman who was walking across the bridge at the time of the explosion was severely injured. She had been stung by a hornet which had crawled up her leg and stung her. She had fallen off the bridge and was severely injured.

7. On 10-10-44, we saw 2000 ft. the fighter was not enemy, but a Russian plane. They have shot them down. Much navigation on Major roads. We used to understand they had been using our planes. Guerrillas at border "A" zone are interested in planes and so forth.

Major LOSS and a minor one sailing out in India, the group went
on to the objective to report for an attack on the Aircraft Factory
at Bangalore.

During at 202030Z a total of 12 aircraft were withdrawn of which nine were fighter planes. The loss account of all the planes at 202030Z was 24,000.

One Squadron aircraft were among the ten that reached air, bombed the primary target, dropping a total of 72 #500 M-6, and 75 #500 M-10 bombs from 22000 feet. Nine of those aircraft ended in a formation formation at 210215Z and one aircraft was in formation with the 1st Bomb Group. The P-61s bombs were fused .2 sec delay nose and .325 sec tail with the P-76 bombs instantaneous nose and non-explosive tail. Of the aircraft over the primary target one aircraft (+130) had an accidental run on the deck run and turned some three or four miles short of the target in reverse.

The main primary target was aircraft factory; most of the personnel on the field were killed. In fact the greatest part of the airfield was completely obscured by the effective smoke-screen. Despite GAFI weather it was necessary to bomb without visual observation was limited to 8 cm. the bombs.

SECRET

2000 hrs. with 3000 ft. A 200 thru 31,000 ft., 14 Feb 45, South.

enemy anti smoke screen up to a point three in the target area after timing of bombing run.

Fighter opposition was very scarce, the form being under almost constant attack from fighter planes leaving the IP and leaving the target area. Practically every type of enemy fighter was encountered ranging from absolute blockade to the never flick and attack. None were definitely pressed to a dog fight. Several instances of plane running were reported. Whether it was intentional or not could not be determined.

Enemy aircraft were very scarce, ranging from accurate to bullet.

No aircraft bombing within sight of opportunity taken or fuel transfer due to scarcethropes. Another aircraft was forced to return when it became necessary to jettison its bombs.

Seven enemy aircraft destroyed and seven downed were claimed by American crews in the group.

Capt in J 3 Marq. and crew flying in aircraft 44-26579, and in formation with the 2nd Bomb Group sustained battle damage to the aircraft when a 20 mm cannon shell hit in the W/C compartment. Window blew immediately and no one in the plane was injured.

All aircraft returned safely to base with the last plane landing at 2240.

Arrived back and informed personnel that [REDACTED] two missions

Aircraft 44-26579 1400 hrs 13:50 hours

| | | | |
|------------------------|------|------------------------|------|
| Capt COODRICK, J. S. | (P) | 2 Sgt ELLIS, J. C. | (A) |
| 1st Lt SANDSTED, R. F. | (CP) | 2 Sgt GILBERTON, J. L. | (B) |
| Capt LAMMELIN, D. J. | (L) | 2 Sgt GILBERTON, J. L. | (L) |
| Capt SCHUBACH, R. J. | (D) | S Sgt GILLER, J. J. | (A) |
| 1st Lt HANLEY, L. P. | (V) | 2 Sgt KELBOURNE, J. C. | (CP) |
| C O UNKLY, R. L. | (RS) | | |

Aircraft 44-26738 1400 hrs 13:40 hours

Down by 25th Squadron by Capt. SHAW, W. M. w/ crew

Aircraft 44-26601 1400 hrs 13:15 hours

| | | | |
|------------------------|------|------------------------|-----|
| 1st Lt HANLEY, J. P. | (P) | 2 Sgt BALTON, J. I. | (A) |
| 1st Lt HANLEY, J. P. | (CP) | 2 Sgt BROWN, J. H. | (B) |
| 1st Lt COODRICK, J. A. | (L) | 2 Sgt GEL, J. B. | (B) |
| 1st Lt HANLEY, J. P. | (V) | S Sgt GILL, J. J. | (B) |
| 2nd Lt BROWNSON, J. W. | (D) | 2 Sgt HANLEY, J. R. | (B) |
| | | 2 Sgt KELBOURNE, G. T. | (B) |

SECRET

... 1100 hrs PT, 4, 1 PM, 1968, at L. Bob., Japan

Oper. 100 hours 46 min

PT 1015

Arr. by 3rd. emb. (on 1st). S. Japan. no crew. Aborted
service because out.

Oper. 100 hours 46 min (1st) 1015 hours

| | | |
|---------------------|-------------------------|-----|
| 100 hrs 46 min, 1st | (P) Cpt. Roselli, G. A. | (P) |
| 100 hrs 46 min, 1st | (P) Cpt. Clark, G. A. | (P) |
| 100 hrs 46 min, 1st | (P) Cpt. Jacen, G. A. | (P) |
| 100 hrs 46 min, 1st | (P) Cpt. Hawley, G. A. | (P) |
| 100 hrs 46 min, 1st | (P) Cpt. Hartman, G. A. | (P) |

Oper. 100 hours 46 min 1015 hours

| | | |
|---------------------|-------------------------|-----|
| 100 hrs 46 min, 1st | (P) Cpt. Roselli, G. A. | (P) |
| 100 hrs 46 min, 1st | (P) Cpt. Clark, G. A. | (P) |
| 100 hrs 46 min, 1st | (P) Cpt. Jacen, G. A. | (P) |
| 100 hrs 46 min, 1st | (P) Cpt. Hawley, G. A. | (P) |
| 100 hrs 46 min, 1st | (P) Cpt. Hartman, G. A. | (P) |

100 hrs 46 min (1st) 1015 hours
Arr. by 3rd. emb. (on 1st). No crew. Aborted service because out.

On December 11, 1968, Capt. Clark and crew were assigned to a mission to ferry aircraft C-12 back to K-1. Aircraft left the unit at 0800 hrs emergency field due to engine damage but had minor repairs quickly and was ready to go. Shortly after take off number three engine nose section caught fire while the aircraft was still climbing. The fire extinguisher was pulled from the engine compartment. Captain Clark then started to return to K-1 after a normal landing approach from the east was attempted. The aircraft was losing altitude rapidly as the gear and flaps were lowered for landing. Power was applied to #1, #3 and #4 engines and #2 failed to respond which resulted in the aircraft falling off on the right side. The power was then cut on #1 and #2 and nose up. A successful belly landing was made just south of the runway. No one was injured, and to Captain Clark a hat was off for good judgment and excellent piloting.

Five admissions complete for December 11, 1968. In the organization spirit to take their mind off of war and work for a while and looked ahead to what was. Colonel H.E. Jones declared Christmas Day a day of rest with all non combat scheduled.

On December 11, Operational Service Officer and Lt. Col. S. A. S., unit commander, and his personnel events to make Christmas and New Year's have a possible. The 100 Acapella choir composed of officers and enlisted men of various organizations on the field, including a children's representation from the 101st Bomb Squadron, directed by Miss Barbara Morris, and others.

SECRET

1997, 3rd ed. rev. by J. P. Dorey. 31 Dec. 1993. 14 pp. £10.00, £6.00 id.

Mr. G. L. Davis, president of a flora, interpretation of the Christmas Story, is to give a presentation at the amphitheater on Christmas Eve. Mr. Davis notes a old Christmas carol in the clear night air struck a responsive chord in men's hearts and souls. A group present, some of whom were spending their first Christmas away from their loved ones.

In our art, the party of ten officers was entertained at the Officers' Club. General MacLean, Group Commander visited with Lt Col Shand and other senior officers and also dropped in on the officers' wives party. During the night a Colonel MacLean was with them and he was in the organization definitely ecide. Last we heard the Group Commander is well and better known while Colonel MacLean could not give his satisfaction completely, though noisy, conduct of operations.

christmas day, can be given services and a hearty meal or dinner of turkey, cranberry sauce, vegetable salad, mincemeat, etc. is all the usual fare. Now as you know from my previous correspondence, I am not a real teetotaler, but I will take the price tag received. In the afternoon athletic games took place with a judo match between the officers and enlisted men, followed by a running race over the scrubland. The race never expired, too much as a time job considering the sun was hot and the distance he would cover, the latter, certainly enough use to get me out on the long road.

On arrival at night, we saw the garrison of the mountain pass. The fort had peaked and pointed its site, operating like a rock in the defile, so as to cover the road. In imitation of the Chinese, it was made of heavy, thick-walled stones, and covered the peace of the fort. The Chinese soldiers followed closely after the rear of the column, and were extinguished on

We on wasted any time in seeking shelter. Numerous slit trenches were dug in the earth, but no most of the men did not stir a tact seemed incredible after all the months the 72's had been off the field. No bombs fell as Chakulia cut frag bombs were dropped on the field at Kharagpur. The section operating the search net for the 72's was on a six or seven intruder planes had been plotted into the area which later split up among the 72 bases. As nearly as could be determined, the closest to Chakulia was 10 miles. At any rate defensive measures came on on the bases. Another Christmas came to an end at Chakulia.

The next day activity in the Squadron was ~~over~~ again routine. Maintenance men had plenty of work to do on all aircraft. In two weeks four aircrafts had been performed, one induction and ~~one~~ repairs were needed.

ACTING

December was a pleasant month for average temperatures. Only one exception did the sun make while in India, with the exception of heavy snows (see -0118). Although the month was mild at 62° F., the dust was thick on the ground, paved roads were covered by snow and it was off the

SECRET

SECRET

Weather Month Dec. 1 and thru 31, 1944, Upper 48, Cont'd

the following. Figures from the Base Weather records for the month follow:

| | |
|-------------------------------------|--------------|
| Normal rainfall for Month | 0.00 inches |
| Actual rainfall for Month | 0.00 inches |
| Highest ceiling was below 1000 feet | Nope |
| Highest maximum temperature | 50° (23 Dec) |
| Highest minimum temperature | 51° (27 Dec) |
| Average maximum temperature | 53° |
| Average minimum temperature | 37° |
| Average temperature | 70° |

Engineering:

The month of December witnessed little change in engineering technique. All aircraft engineering personnel continued to turn out good maintenance in preparing the Superforts for combat missions. Capt. Harriet V. Jester took over the duties of 1st. Chief and Maj. G. W. Griville, (AG) dimonds returned to his first love, the chief and was assigned to aircraft #795 the day after Christmas.

All planes in the organization except #295, 13 and 412 underwent some local flap modification during the month. The modification not only reduced drag when flying surface, but also made engine cooling even when in almost closed position.

Six new B-29 aircraft were received and assigned to the organization during December. All of them were installed with completely modified engines which included cross-over oil tubes, ducted ballutes and reworked rocket arms. The following new aircraft were assigned to the 48er and recorded as grins:

| Date | Aircraft Number | Origin of Manufacturer |
|--------|-----------------|------------------------|
| 3 Dec | 42-24739 | Midchita |
| 6 Dec | 42-93359 | Kenton, Seattle |
| 16 Dec | 42-24718 | Midchita |
| 22 Dec | 42-24740 | Midchita |
| 29 Dec | 42-24795 | Midchita |

The following aircraft were erased from the Squadron's records during the month:

| Date | Aircraft Number | Action |
|--------|-----------------|---|
| 14 Dec | 42-6303 | Returned to USA by ANC |
| 15 Dec | 42-24714 | Lost on standard mission on 14 December |
| 15 Dec | 42-93031 | Lost on RAMPART mission on 14 December |
| 19 Dec | 42-24756 | Abandoned by crew on ground |
| 19 Dec | 42-6276 | Abandoned by crew away |

SECRET

1960, later from 20, 20-20 three '31 less all 2-18 2-22, cont'd

... *Chancery* ;

of training program, portaged by Major General Ladd to be carried on in connection with normal combat operations, increased in tempo however. A certain section was set up at Broad Headquarters which had a policy and fixed two programs of training. One subjects were given to the Headquarters, while it remained for the Battalions to also do their independent but progressive job of ground schools. On 15 October last Lt Col. K. H. Weller was appointed Head of the Training Directorate and Lt Col. J. C. Smith was appointed Director of the Ground Schools.

During the month of April was scarcely made by the commanders due to the fact that the weather was bad and the mission over the range of Lake Superior required about three hours of work per day. On May 10th, Mr. W. H. Vinton completed his ground survey of Lorain. On May 11th he also completed the air stage. Very navigator had to make a flight on the first part of the trip because of bad weather.

Wine and smoked biscuits were given to the pilots, co-pilots, radio operator and tail gunner. Meetings were held to allow engineers to make notes and discuss latest information on performance and maintenance of aircraft.

• Training, was to initiate the players in crews and was performed by the team leader. Crew could complete their theory classes in approximately ten days.

... **and** **so** **on** **—** Up!

After December passing 1940, sufficient time had elapsed and appropriate time had been given to the plateau to form a few conclusions that could now be made as a result of time and experience.

The 45th Bomb Squadron received the first B-29 aircraft to come off the production line at Boeing's Wichita Factory on 1 July 1943. Lt Col G. J. SCHAFFER, Squadron Commander, was checked off almost immediately and the loss of the Squadron followed rapidly; beginning with the second flight to become first pilot less veterans were selected men from the 45th. Lt Col J. C. Johnson, Air Materiel Command and the old 45th bomb squadron.

But the advantages of hand-picked men disappear when we go to make up a heavy organization in heavy combat, where selected men in each unit have been given further specialized training in order to effectively handle their

The training program will reinforce the knowledge of the B-29's performance characteristics of the aircraft, and will be responsible to give the pilot information on flying

SECRET

History, 45th Bomb Sq., 1 Dec thru 31 Dec 44, Annexes 65, Cont'd

Personnel and equipment were in place at Gauhati, India by the end of April. Flight operations began in May with cargo hauls across the hump to the forward area field in China. Supplies, spare parts, personnel, gasoline and a thousand different items were shipped to China to set up the base and to provide the material and personnel necessary to sustain combat operations started from that point.

The Hump became a proving ground for the B-29. Heavy aircraft loading, and high temperatures of India, on take off, weather and hazardous terrain tested the pilot's skill on every flight, yet each flight was like a trial with an "unknown." Pilots and bombers lost over the hump, however, no one could look back "in eight days" and say the losses were due to pilot error, because at the time the accidents occurred the reason was that something happened with his new aircraft that the pilot knew nothing about. Those flights, though prove costly, provided "know how" for the B-29. Emergencies and near accidents provided information on equipment failures and flying characteristics of the B-29 that led to needed modifications.

Combat missions began with the strike on Chongqing to SHENKOK on 15 June followed by the YANAN, JAPAN strike on 20 June. Two missions in July and one in August provided several items of information. Strike control, range, bomb load, formation, accuracy, radar and radio operation were just a few.

September brought the assignment of General CURTIS S. LEWIS to the XI Bomber Command as Commanding General. During the months that followed his determination and development of tactics paid heavy dividends. Initiation of the 11 plane formation, the rendezvous point and "lead crew" principle were outstanding developments that increased range, bomb load and strike efficiency. Proven identification and bomber perfection improved bombing results. The combat crew members were boost when they realized their efforts were beginning to tell on the enemy.

The Squadron played an important part in all phases of operations. Each week and month saw it becoming more and more into a strong combat organization. It faced the new year with confidence and ability gained through the most trying period of the war. The organization has changed since the war began. Looking at the present situation we were not certain objectives could be formed.

The B-29, generally speaking, is beyond doubt an outstanding success in the fighter for which it was designed. Its performance is superb, its capacity has been exceeded, and its modifications have been implemented. No doubt the future will bring many more achievements as time goes on.

After the first 1000 sorties the damage to the aircraft was

the damage to the

SECRET

disposition that will see work of Dec 2, 1945, Cont'd.

unmodified, over 50% the runway, is safely to approach engines for landing. However, one or two or more on lines on one side when on landing approach and takeoff is still necessary to get the airplane up to the runway, because the runway is relatively ineffective if it is sometimes impossible to maintain a 50% takeoff approach and the airplane is pulled to one side by the power of one running engine. A somewhat steeper rudder might be better without becoming too difficult to control, because at present flights can not fail from an altitude of 200 feet without too much effort.

The development of an effective heating system, which keeps ice from forming on the tail fin, has made the airplane more temperate. The very low temperatures encountered in operation, both day and night, were the greatest problem encountered in operation. Within a few days, however, an action flying had been prior to problems and the aircraft was operational.

The first operation of the aircraft had become progressively less difficult. The first factor was the modifications on the engines of the new airplanes resulting from organization. Better engine operation, greater lubrication reliability. From the unmodified engine it was found necessary to inspect the "car" of the pistons (Nos 1, 3, 5, 10) every 25 hours of operation and all cylinders every 50 hours. The cause for side play in the valve guide was found to be an important factor in the Squadron's success in not losing an engine during war, because of valve failure, since the latter part of July 1944. When the check is also pulled on modified engines, so far no engine valve side play has been found.

An increase in authorization of airplane mechanics, with greatly facilitated rapid maintenance. This fact is especially true, since we continually have no more aircraft on hand than authorized by the table of organization. The excess in aircraft assignments do not offer any difficulty in other maintenance specialties and no increase in personnel is needed.

Experience has proven that the maintenance responsibility should be under the Squadron Commander, who is not a Base Engineer. Initiative, experience and Esprit de Corps are direct benefits of this arrangement. friendly competition between maintenance men in the Squadron is to be encouraged to labor in adverse conditions at 10,000 feet in the air. The Squadron Commander is more intelligent engineer and consultant on mission planning than any other member of the engineering section. In this connection, the pilot caliber of the men in the XI Bomber Command is reflected in the efficiency of the B-29 even when it was unmodified. Sustained by months of practical maintenance experience, the maintenance crews of the flying organization, the XI Bomber Command, the 9th, 30th, 31st and other organizations of the XI Bomber Command, are the engineering-wise potential of Squadron 1000, now based in the States.

More of the Squadron has been governmented in the past year, certain factors being responsible for the morale.

SECRET

SECRET - APPROVED FOR RELEASE AT THE END OF 1964 BY THE AIR FORCE ATTACHE

There was no very formal or strict organization of men in lower command, though it had to be selected with a high level of experience in the organization of their rank group. With a continuous overlay in combat crews, the liaison department in States in April 1943, previous leave been granted, particularly for enlisted men. With the overlays of different in the units, unit crests had been made in the table of Organization for rank that had a unique occasion and called for higher grades . . . it is explained, I am advised.

Experience in promoting officers that did have position vacancies was a priority. In April 1943, "Brown" policy was put into effect two weeks before the organization departed for overseas service with the explanation that it was desired for a man to prove himself worthy, although the personnel were of higher experience in flying time and grade than the majority of organizations leaving for overseas service. When promotion recommendations were accepted once again, they were committee returned for consideration of an error in submission due to a subsequent change of policy, such as an anticipated new form. Policy was inconsistent. Some promotions were paid six weeks apart by a policy establishment. So a promotion, even at intervals circumstances, had to be submitted on several different occasions, and the day was standardised policy directed in ~~the Brown~~ a different date while there is no record in it were first being submitted for the first time. On 1st July 1943, or condition in the administrative procedure of demand the Brown only had one officer promotion from November 1943 to July 1943. The difficulties of administrative procedure were easily understood, due to Brown's lack of knowledge and publication, yet morale suffered noticeably because in our front of thirty it seemed as if there existed a reluctance to promote.

Awards and decorations, and rotation were other items that entered into the morale picture. All men in the Squadron had worked hard, with an untried weapon lying at the end of the war's longest supply line, skill and improvisation licked numerous obstacles. No one of them minimised their accomplishment, but their feeling of pride, as in all squadrons at the moment, was justified in view of terrain, weather and performance and operation of the aircraft difficulties. Combat missions carried them to Japan, Manchuria, China, Formosa, Malaya, Sumatra, Burma, Thailand and French Indo-China. Bombing, navigation, engineering, supply, radar and airplane operation were tested from one extreme to the other. Every territory and opposition became a proving ground as the test program produced volumes of data all important to the future of the air war against Japan. There seemed to be only one way to recognize the overall contribution of the Chinese officers of the G1 member Command who are still awaiting cumulative "know how" . . . a Presidential Citation. Certainly no unit could be more deserving of such recognition.

Personnel:

* Commander - Capt L. G. V. Wilson R.A.M.C. and a Capt Lawton K. Patterson returned from the General Hospital at Calcutta and were once again assigned to the Squadron.

SECRET

adversary, with 20th Sq. 1 Dec thru 31 Dec 44. In addition, Cont'd

1 December - Two new replacement combat crews followed the organization having just arrived from the States. The following named personnel were assigned:

| | |
|---------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| 1st Lt MILLS L. EALO | Major [REDACTED] S. P. ROBINSON JR. |
| 2nd Lt JAMES F. DAKIN | 1st Lt [REDACTED] KEN L. DOVER |
| 2nd Lt PATRICK W. DILL JR | 1st Lt [REDACTED] MC GOWAN |
| 2nd Lt ERIC J. MIZZA | 1st Lt [REDACTED] E. L. REED |
| 2 Sgt Joseph J. Valley | 2nd Lt [REDACTED] ALIP A. DE LAIS |
| 2 Sgt William Knobel | 2nd Lt [REDACTED] S. Kraver |
| Cpl Harvey J. Kelle | 2nd Lt [REDACTED] Calvin J. Lamb |
| Cpl George F. Becker | 2nd Lt [REDACTED] Alan J. Anthony |
| Cpl Charles C. Sally | 2nd Lt [REDACTED] Courtney K. Neirn |
| Cpl George B. Beckley | 2nd Lt [REDACTED] Harry J. Hanson |
| Cpl [REDACTED] Radlofsky | |

✓ December - Captain JACK C. LEONARD and Lieutenant [REDACTED] JONES returned to the unit from the hospital at Chengtu.

14 December - 1st Lt LOREN C. COOL was assigned to the Squadron as Assistant Intelligence Officer on transfer route from the 486th Bomb Group.

17 December - Captain HOWARD C. SHAWNS and crew, 1st Lt ALVIN N. McKEEAN and crew were officially reported missing from mission of 14 December.

20 December - Captain ALVIN B. MOSS departed the States with a medical transfer. His knee injury sustained during YATATA mission of 20 August had left him physically unable to fly before he left Captain LEONARD and Major HAGLUND presented him with the Distinguished Flying Cross earned for meritorious achievement on the flight in August.

23 December - Captain HOWARD C. HAGLUND was killed in an airplane crash at A-1. Captain HAGLUND was a passenger and had been on DS at the control center in the forward.

27 December - Major HOWARD C. MOSS departed for Japan to assume command of the Far East Area 40th Group before the other officers and enlisted men. On 28 December he was officially transferred to Headquarters 40th Bomb Group. He replaced Major N. S. MILLER who returned to the States for medical reasons.

Strength of the Squadron as of the [REDACTED] ending of the month are indicated below and on the following [REDACTED]

1 December 1944

| | |
|--------|------------|
| 1st Lt | [REDACTED] |
| 2nd Lt | [REDACTED] |
| Cpl | [REDACTED] |
| Cpl | [REDACTED] |